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I
It is no longer questionable that the earlier
breaking loose of fiscal expenditures and the
resulting increase in government debt repre-
sent a very serious economic policy problem in
Hungary. Over the past year, the Government
and the National Assembly have taken several
decisions to promote responsible financial
management and address the debt problem in
an efficient manner: the new Constitution con-
tains a public finances chapter, the Fiscal
Council has received strengthened mandates,
and the Act on the State Audit Office of
Hungary (SAO) has been recodified by the
National Assembly.
These are new times that require new solu-
tions, and this is especially true for public
finances. The change was necessary, new rules
had to be laid down and new institutions had to
be set up because neither the SAO, nor other
independent institutions had been able to pre-
vent the chronic public overspending and the
drastic increase in government debt in earlier
years (see Chart 1).
No doubt, the economic crisis and the disor-
derly public finances of Hungary warrant sav-
ings measures. Consequently, the same or
increasing amount of tasks has to be performed
using the same amount of or even less
resources than earlier. Therefore, renewal does
not mean the expansion of the institutional
system, but the widening of powers, the
increasing of transparency and making sanc-
tioning possible.
One of the preconditions for economic
recovery and breaking free from the debt trap
is strict saving, responsible management of
public funds and national assets, which, first
of all, means keeping public finances on a
short leash.
Consequently, it is a fundamental national
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interest to have a transparent, efficient and
accountable Budget Act, which deals with
public revenues and expenditures. The various
institutions should assist the National
Assembly in drawing up a realistic and feasible
budget, and encourage the Government to
implement it. If the budget is built on too
optimistic macroeconomic forecasts, it jeop-
ardises the feasibility of the budget appropria-
tion bill. Therefore, it needs to be examined
whether the macroeconomic projection of the
Government is well-founded. Public finances
need to be put on a sustainable path, i.e.
deficit and debt should be prevented from
soaring.
The public finances chapter of the new
Constitution, the strengthening of the Fiscal
Council and the recodification of the SAO Act
were the consequences of the realisation that
greater emphasis needs to be put on public
finances than earlier, and that the institutional
system that existed until then had been unable
to ensure sustainability.
CONSTITUTION AND PUBLIC FINANCES
– WITH A NEW APPROACH AGAINST DEBT
In financial circles, Hungary was an example of
the vulnerability of state budget for years,
which is not surprising in view of deficits
exceeding the budgeted amounts by far in each
year following the turn of the millennium (see
Chart 2).2 It also discredited the country that
within the European Union Hungary was the
first state (as early as in 2008) that needed to
ask for a life-belt from international organisa-
tions. The Hungarian budget showed an
extremely high deficit, and the increase in gov-
ernment debt accelerated in an unprecedented
manner: in early 2011 the debt ratio exceeded
80 per cent of annual economic performance.
Considering the developments, it is not sur-
prising that emphasis was laid on the responsi-
ble management of public funds in the new
Constitution as well, which enters into force in
January 2012. This is a major change compared
to the Constitution currently in effect, which,
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at best, deals with issues of public finances only
indirectly.
The new Constitution contains several very
strict regulations to ensure responsible finan-
cial management. For example, the National
Assembly must not adopt a budget that would
result in government debt above one half of the
gross domestic product.4 Moreover, while gov-
ernment debt exceeds this value, the National
Assembly may only adopt budgets that provide
for the reduction of government debt.
Deviation from these rules is allowed only in
very exceptional cases, which clearly shows
that debt reduction has become the highest pri-
ority of economic policy in Hungary.
The inclusion of the debt ceiling in the
Constitution means that in connection with
fiscal disciplining Hungary, according to the
categorisation by Wyplosz (2005), opted for the
rule-based solution as opposed to the institu-
tional one, which is explained by the fact that
the credibility of Hungarian economic policy
became significantly eroded after 2002. The
strength of the Fiscal Council is also primarily
attributable to the Constitution; the task of the
Council is exactly to enforce the constitution-
al rule so that it is more than written word.
Another important new feature of the
Constitution is that the Fiscal Council was
included among the organs that have a consti-
tutional legal status, i.e. it received equal status
with the SAO and the National Bank of
Hungary (MNB, Magyar Nemzeti Bank). In
order to reduce the outstanding debt, the
Constitution also grants the organisation a
general right of returning. This means that the
Hungarian National Assembly undertook self-
restraint that is outstanding even at interna-
tional level, as it will be possible to adopt the
budget only with the consent of the Council.
The primary aim of the mandate granted to the
Council is to forward the best, most reliable
and best-founded draft budget possible to the
National Assembly. It is the members of the
National Assembly who will have to vote and
assume responsibility.
Chart 2
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The Constitution has been strongly criticised
by some politicians and analysts because it
reduces government controls and brakes.
However, the truth is that the public finance reg-
ulations of the new Constitution, and the provi-
sions concerning debt and the strengthened
Fiscal Council in particular, will mean unprece-
dented control from the aspect of the budget.
RENEWED AND STRENGTHENED FISCAL
COUNCIL
The Fiscal Council is an organ that supports
the legislative activity of the National
Assembly and examines the grounding of the
central budget.5 The new Constitution has
granted very strong mandates to the Fiscal
Council, not only compared to the previous
Council, but also compared to similar institu-
tions of other countries.
 How is the new Fiscal Council different, what
additional mandates does it have?
In Hungary, the idea of establishing a Fiscal
Council was first brought up in 2006, when
government debt was soaring, and in 2009 a
council was set up, which had a staff of its own,
and was therefore a costly organisation.
However, without real powers, it was relatively
weak. According to Kopits – Romhányi (2010),
when the Council was established, the issue of
determining the maximum levels of govern-
ment debt, budget deficit and general govern-
ment expenditures arose, and it was also dis-
cussed whether the Council should be granted
coercive powers. Finally, the ceilings, which
would have imposed serious limitations on the
Government, were not introduced, and an
institution was established that did not have
any “direct legal means to comply with the
rules and requirements”, i.e. it could “use the
means of convincing rather than those of coer-
cion”.  The task of the Fiscal Council would
have been to prepare economic forecasts,
impact assessments and estimates for each bill
that affects the budget, but the Council did not
receive any decision-making powers. 
In 2011, this Council was replaced by the
new, smaller and cheaper Fiscal Council, which,
at the same time, has more mandates. It con-
sists of the Governor of the MNB, the
President of the SAO, and a Chairperson
appointed by the President of the Republic.
This body is comprised of only three members,
and it does not have an office of its own, which
is possible because the Council relies on the
professional staff of the MNB and of the SAO
as well as on the analyses of acknowledged
workshops of Hungarian scientific life. The
change in 2011 was significant, because the new
Council does not receive any state subsidy and
can return the draft budget to the Government,
whereas only in this year HUF 835.5 million
should have been spent on the old Council
according to the draft budget, while it only had
a right to give an opinion.
One of the reasons for the transformation in
2011 was that although the Council would have
been granted some kind of veto right in budget
matters according to the original idea, finally it
did not materialise, and thus the Council
became a “toothless lion”. In 2011, the law
changed in a way that before submission to the
National Assembly, the Council can return its
opinion on the draft budget to the
Government, and compel the Government to
prepare a new draft, which means much greater
authority than the right to give an opinion. The
right of the Council is limited to the extent
that although it can return the draft once, it
cannot return the second draft; the law only
allows the publication of the opinion of the
Council on the website of the National
Assembly.
This right was enhanced by the new
Constitution, which stipulates that as of 2012,
it will not be possible to adopt the budget with- PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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out the consent of the Council, i.e. returning
the draft budget will not be a single opportuni-
ty. The Council has to judge whether the con-
stitutional requirement regarding government
debt is met (i.e. if debt reduction or at least the
maintenance of the debt level is ensured); if
not, the Government has to prepare a new draft
budget. The mandate of the Council is further
strengthened by the provision of the
Constitution that if the country does not have
an adopted budget by 31 March, the President
of the Republic may dissolve the National
Assembly, and may call new elections.
The pivotal act on the Fiscal Council has not
been prepared yet,6 and for the time being
practical experience concerning operations is
not available either, so it is uncertain what the
general right of returning granted to the
Council will actually mean. Based on the text
of the Constitution, it will formally have a
right of veto, as, according to the general justi-
fication, the Council “will be strengthened by
being granted a right of veto against the act on
the central budget if the latter does not comply
with the provisions of the Constitution regard-
ing the extent of government debt”. The same
is included in the detailed justification as well,
which says that “the body is also granted a right
of veto regarding the Act on the Central
Budget”. However, one must not forget that
eventually it is the Hungarian National
Assembly that is responsible for the budget, as
the National Assembly is the only competent
body authorised by the voters to decide on the
budget. This also means that the primary
responsibility of the Fiscal Council is to ensure
submission of a well-founded draft budget to
the National Assembly.
 What is the difference between the Hungarian
Fiscal Council and similar bodies of other countries?
Fiscal councils operate in many countries of
the western world. The comparative study by
Calmfors – Wren-Lewis (2011) lists 11 operat-
ing councils (in addition, professional discus-
sions have started about the eventual introduc-
tion of fiscal councils in another three coun-
tries: Slovakia, Ireland and Portugal). There are
councils the legal predecessors of which were
established decades ago: for example, institu-
tions that today may be considered fiscal coun-
cils were set up in the Netherlands in 1945, in
Denmark in 1962 and in the United States in
1974. In the last two to three years, as a result
of debt problems coming to the surface, sever-
al states that had not had fiscal councils earlier
established their respective organisations,
including, inter alia, the United Kingdom,
Sweden, and Hungary.
According to Calmfors (2011), in each case
the councils were brought into being by the
same phenomenon, i.e. the chronic overspend-
ing by the governments and the increase in
government debt. Wren-Lewis (2011) adds that
although there are differences between the two
institutions, monetary councils, which have a
proven track record in central bank policy,
served as models in setting up the fiscal coun-
cils. Due to the current crisis, several Western
European states and OECD member countries
simultaneously had to face the fact that their
general government deficit was swelling and
government debt was increasing to unprece-
dented levels. Reinhart – Rogoff (2011) express-
ly state that due to the high and increasing gov-
ernment debts and the similar problems of the
private sector, the period between 2008 and
2017 will be called the decade of debt in the
developed world.
The gross government debt of the United
States, the leading economic power of the
world, already exceeds USD 14,300 billion, and
the debt ratio equals more than 100 per cent of
the US gross domestic product (GDP). In the
United Kingdom, where the debt ratio
amounted to 30 per cent some years ago, this
ratio has grown to almost 60 per cent by now,
while it is 94 per cent in Ireland, a country PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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where debt was a mere 25 per cent in 2007 and
which is on the verge of national bankruptcy at
present. Government debt in Japan, which was
hit by natural disasters this last spring,
increased to more than 200 per cent of GDP .
This by itself already means serious indebted-
ness, and the expectedly huge reconstruction
costs will only add to it (see Chart 3).
At present, the debt-to-GDP ratio in
Hungary is somewhat below 80 per cent,8
which is lower than the values listed above, but
the developments in Hungary are alarming
from two aspects. In less than a decade, the
government debt of Hungary increased by
almost 30 percentage points, and as a result of
the chronic overspending in recent years,
Hungary has lost the confidence of investors as
well, which reduced the level of sustainable
debt.
The seriousness of the situation in Hungary
also contributed to the fact that upon the
renewal of the Constitution the new
Hungarian Fiscal Council was granted a deci-
sion-making right, which is considerable even
by international standards. In international
practice, Hungary is an exception, as such insti-
tutions elsewhere only have a right to give an
opinion. Many of the councils are typically
independent organs that prepare studies
regarding the budget and economic policy deci-
sions, and formulate recommendations for the
sustainability of fiscal policy. However, they do
not have decision-making competence.
According to Wyplosz (2008), based on their
competences, fiscal councils can be classified
into three main groups. It is typical of the
councils with the weakest mandates that their
opinion fits in the process of preparing the
budget, i.e. they can be considered as some
kind of advisory institutions of the govern-
ment and the national assembly, which prepare
forecasts, but do not even come up with rec-
ommendations. This type of “wise men’s coun-
cil” can be found in Germany, South Korea,
Mexico and Japan.
A great majority of the councils have some-
Chart 3 
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what wider powers than that, since they oper-
ate as advisory organisations that are independ-
ent of the legislature and the executive.
Typically, their role and task is to submit rec-
ommendations every year for the budget of the
given year; these recommendations are made
public. Of course, it is the national assembly
that decides on the budget. These councils have
an effect on fiscal developments if they prove
to be more influential and stronger than the
interest groups whose interest is the increasing
of fiscal expenditures and the reduction of
taxes. Consequently, the strength of these
councils lies in their credibility, and require
other interest groups to be driven back, that is,
good governance. Fiscal councils like that oper-
ate, for example, in Belgium, Denmark, the
Netherlands and Chile. The council has a
somewhat more important role in Sweden,
where its mandate covers not only forecasting,
but also the examination of the consequences
of economic policy decisions.
However, the above models are not viable in
highly indebted countries that have not fol-
lowed a credible economic policy for years.9 In
such states, progress can only be brought by
fiscal councils that also have decision-making
rights, as the hands of governments inclined to
overspend have to be tied. In theoretical works
dealing with fiscal councils, this decision-mak-
ing right is supposed to mean that the fiscal
council is entitled to determine the size of the
fiscal balance (typically of the budget deficit),
but without having any influence on the mag-
nitude or composition of the budget, which
clearly constitute the tasks of the legislators.
The strength of the decisions of the council is
increased if they are mandatory for the govern-
ment and the national assembly, i.e. the elected
bodies (primarily the national assembly) have
room for manoeuvre within the limits deter-
mined by the council.
Although the Hungarian Fiscal Council can-
not influence the absolute size and structure of
the budget, pursuant to the Constitution it is
obliged to prevent the budget from adding to
government debt. The transformation of the
Hungarian council in 2011 and the adoption of
the new Constitution may serve as an example
even at international level, because no other
council has such strong decision-making rights
anywhere else. The data and analyses of
Calmfors (2011) and Wyplosz (2008) also sug-
gest that Hungary is the only country to take
the reduction of government debt so seriously
that it has tied even its own hands in this
respect.
In regulating the spending of public funds,
the choice between credibility and flexibility
as well as finding the right ratio always require
consideration, as flexibility allows deviation
from the norm and the promise, thus reducing
credibility. The choice is largely determined
by the past, experiences and institutional-cul-
tural environment of the given country.
Indeed, it matters whether or not a given
country is credible on the basis of earlier expe-
rience: if a government is less credible, flexi-
bility needs to be more limited in order to
regain credibility, whereas increased flexibility
entails only a smaller loss of credibility in the
case of states that have been pursuing a reli-
able fiscal policy than in the case of a state
that is not credible.
The possibility of a trade-off between credi-
bility and flexibility and the differences in
opportunities across states with various histo-
ries of credibility are illustrated in Chart 4.10 In
a given institutional environment it is not pos-
sible to achieve simultaneous improvements in
the credibility and flexibility of the fiscal poli-
cy framework, i.e. a choice has to be made
between the two “positive” factors. However,
the opportunities vary across countries,
depending primarily on the extent of their ear-
lier credibility. Chart 4 shows the case of three
countries: the credibility of country A has been
above average, country B has had average cred- PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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ibility, while the credibility of country C has
been below average in the past period. 
Country A can significantly increase its cred-
ibility by having to make a smaller flexibility
sacrifice (limitation) in exchange;
•  To attain the same objective, country C
has to give up most of or the whole of its
possibility to pursue a flexible fiscal policy;
• The position of country B can be designat-
ed between countries A and C.
From 2002 on, Hungary was steadily losing
its fiscal and economic policy credibility (in
graphical terms, the curve expressing the possi-
bilities was increasingly pressed towards the
origin), which entailed that for a “unit” of
improvement in credibility it had to give up an
increasing share of the flexibility of the system.
By 2010, the decline in credibility reached such
a level that Hungary could not do anything else
but set up the Fiscal Council and radically
renew it in 2010; the Government had to tie its
own hands for the sake of the credibility of the
promise of deficit and debt reduction. The debt
ceiling had to be set in the Constitution for the
same reason; this also considerably reduces
flexibility, that is, rapid adjustment to changes,11
but because of the extent of the loss of credi-
bility of the Hungarian economic policy, the
country had to endure this as well in order to
regain confidence. For years, economic litera-
ture has been debating whether credibility
should be restored by so-called rule-based
measures or through an institutional-organisa-
tional system that also allows flexible reactions.
However, as a result of the chronic overspend-
ing in recent years, Hungary had no choice: the
application of flexibility and soft solutions
threatened with such a considerable loss of
credibility that the country could not afford.
Therefore, the only possible solution was to
apply the rule-based system, which has to be
operated by a Fiscal Council that is vested with
strong authority.
The Hungarian council is in a special situa-
tion also because it does not have a staff of its
own, i.e. it consists of only three members.
Chart 4 
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Independent council staff was dispensed with
because the Council has two members (the
Governor of the Central Bank and the
President of the SAO) who direct independent
institutions with a serious background of ana-
lysts, i.e. nothing justifies not to use the exist-
ing staff to prepare the impact studies and the
analyses about the substantiation of the budg-
et. Thus the Hungarian Fiscal Council is the
smallest in the world, and as its members do
not receive any remuneration, it is also certain-
ly one of the most economical councils. This is
extremely important in the current fiscal situa-
tion, both from the aspect of the budget and in
terms of the social support necessary for the
often painful transformations. Similar institu-
tions of other countries employ at least a dozen
staff; indeed, Calmfors – Wren-Lewis (2011)
cite one with over 250, which would rightfully
seem lavish in today’s Hungary.
THE ROLE OF THE SAO IN ENSURING
SUSTAINABLE PUBLIC FINANCES
The State Audit Office of Hungary (SAO)
plays a prominent role in controlling the budg-
et. As provided for in the Constitution, “the
State Audit Office of Hungary is the financial
and economic audit organisation of the
National Assembly.” The tasks of the SAO
include, inter alia, a review of the financial man-
agement of the general government, and of the
substantiation of the budget appropriation bill.
The Fiscal Council works complementing the
work of the SAO, but vested with other man-
dates; the close relationship between the two
institutions is shown by the fact that the
President of the SAO is one of the members of
the Council.
The new SAO Act is also an important ele-
ment of the renewal of the Hungarian public
finance system.12 The significance of the Act is
shown by the fact that it was the first pivotal
bill submitted to National Assembly following
the adoption of the new Constitution. The
SAO also participated in the preparation of the
bill;13 the Act was drafted relying on the SAO’s
more than twenty years of experience. This
legal regulation, which entered into force on 1
July 2011, promises considerable renewal in
three areas; namely, in the fields of the man-
dates of the SAO, independence guarantees,
and transparency.
Sanctions for more efficient operations
Under the new Act, the SAO is vested with dis-
cernibly stronger powers than earlier in order
to make sure audits will not remain without
consequences. Although the Act retains the
SAO’s nature as an agency, it makes, unlike
before, cooperation with it mandatory and
sanctions failure to do so. In contrast with the
permissive rules of the previous SAO Act, the
new law includes provisions prescribing specif-
ic actions with deadlines attached.
The Act provides that the audited organisa-
tions must supply all the information and make
available all the documentation required for the
planning and conduct of audits. This is a signif-
icant step forward in that the previous legisla-
tion did not sanction refusal to cooperate, even
though such refusal could have thwarted the
audit. For the cases of squandering public
funds, the President of the SAO has also been
granted the right to initiate the freezing of
funds or even the suspension of the disburse-
ment of state subsidies. Pursuant to the new
Act, the head of the audited organisation is
obliged to draw up an action plan in response
to the findings of the audit report and send it
to the President of the SAO by a set deadline,
while this provision was not included in the
previous regulation.
The powers of the SAO are considerably
bolstered by the prospect of up to three years PUBLIC FINANCE FOCUS 
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imprisonment for dishonouring the obligations
related to SAO audits. In cases of minor viola-
tions of the law or wasteful practices, the Act
also allows the President of the State Audit
Office to remind the head of the audited
organisation in a letter, who in this case is
obliged to take the necessary measures and
inform the President of the SAO thereof.
Strengthened independence of the
SAO
The new SAO Act provides safeguards of inde-
pendence as the backbone of the SAO’s opera-
tions both financially and at the institutional
and organisational levels. To that end, it is
ensured that the SAO’s budget is not reduced
in nominal terms from one year to the next and
it is assigned additional statutory responsibili-
ties only if the necessary funds are also provid-
ed. Financial independence is also guaranteed
by decoupling auditors’ base remuneration
from civil servants’ pay as the act links audi-
tors’ earnings, which are subject to strict con-
flict of interest provisions, to the level of aver-
age national economy monthly gross earnings.
Thus, changes in the base remuneration have
become automatic, and hence the Government
is prevented from influencing them.
As a safeguard of institutional and organisa-
tional independence, the SAO continues to
report only to the National Assembly and the
findings and conclusions of its reports may not
be contested before courts or other authorities.
The SAO works out the professional guidelines
of audits and its methods on its own. The Act
allows the President of the SAO considerable
leeway in shaping the SAO’s organisation,
which enables the SAO to respond flexibly to
new challenges. It remains a guarantee of inde-
pendence that nominations for the SAO’s
President excludes candidates who have been
members of the Government or acted as elect-
ed leaders in any party’s central or national
organ in the preceding four years. Another
guarantee is the provision that requires the
engagement of the President of the SAO in
drafting any and all legislation on the SAO’s
work and the general government.
Transparent operations and the power
of publicity
The Act attaches particular importance to the
issue of transparency, which is considered a key
principle (for more details, see Domokos,
2010), and requires that all SAO reports should
be public. This is to ensure audit findings are
made known to the public and thus contribute
to the responsible management of public funds
and national assets. It is the interest of opera-
tional transparency that, even though it is with-
in the SAO’s responsibility and competence to
determine its audit methodologies, the Act
places the SAO under an obligation to disclose
the methods and professional guidelines which
it follows in conducting audits.
Pursuant to the new Act, audits on the spend-
ing of public funds and the management of
national assets have to be made available to the
public. First, this improves the efficiency of the
SAO’s work and the utilisation of the reports.
Namely, the SAO is neither a court, nor an
authority; its power largely stems from publicity.
Second, it complies with the democratic expecta-
tion of the society that tax-paying citizens want
to know what happens to their money.
The Act also expresses the intention that the
SAO’s reports need to be considered an
acknowledged and sought after source of infor-
mation. Accordingly, the SAO, also taking the
opportunities offered by the world wide web,
conducts active and proactive communication,
and ensures that socially relevant information
reaches the public in an easy-to-understand
form and through accessible channels.301
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Economics of the University of Miskolc on
19 May 2011. Pál Péter Kolozsi, PhD also con-
tributed to the compilation of this study.
2 A considerable deterioration in public finances
started in 2002. The (two-year) Budget Act con-
cerning that year originally provided for a deficit of
HUF 505 billion, which was raised by the 2001 Act
on the Final Accounts to HUF 565 billion. The
deficit was raised to HUF 1,249 billion in the 2003
Budget Act, but the actual deficit already exceeded
HUF 1,570 billion, which was more than triple the
original deficit.
3 A negative net financing capacity means a net bor-
rowing requirement. This is the amount that the
state has to obtain through debt issues in order to
maintain the solvency of the budget, not including
debt repayments. General government deficit
accounts for most of it.
4 Although it is not a widespread solution, the
Hungarian Constitution is not the only one that
contains provisions for the magnitude of govern-
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world, as this may significantly improve the credi-
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